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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowl-
edge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We characterize this
relation in the standard context of imperfect information concurrent game. We
assume that whenever a set of agents form a coalition to achieve a goal, they
share their knowledge before acting. Based on this assumption, we propose new
semantics for alternating-time temporal logic with imperfect information and per-
fect recall. It turns out that this semantics is sufficient to preserve all the desirable
properties of coalition ability in traditional coalition logics. Meanwhile, we inves-
tigate how knowledge sharing within a group of agents contributes to its coali-
tional ability through the interplay of epistemic and coalition modalities. This
work provides a partial answer to the question: which kind of group knowledge
is required for a group to achieve their goals in the context of imperfect informa-
tion.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about coalitional abilities and strategic interactions is fundamental in analy-
sis of multiagent systems (MAS). Among many others [8,14,15,25,27], Coalition Logic
(CL) [22] and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [2] are typical logical frame-
works that allow to specify and reason about effects of coalitions [16]. In a nutshell,
these logics express coalition ability using a modality in the form, say 〈〈G〉〉ϕ, to mean
coalition G (a set of agents) can achieve a property ϕ, regardless what the other agents
do. ATL/CL assume that each agent in a multi-agent system has complete informa-
tion about the system at all states (perfect information). Obviously this is not always
true in the real world. Different agents might own different knowledge about their
system. To model the systems in which agents have imperfect information, a few at-
tempts have been made in the last few years by extending ATL with epistemic oper-
ators [11,17,19,26,?,?]. With the extensions, agents’ abilities are associated with their
knowledge. For instance, assuming a few agents are trying to open a safe, only the ones
who know the code have the ability to open the safe.
One difficulty of ATL with imperfect information is how to model knowledge shar-
ing among a coalition. In other words, if a group of agents form a coalition, whether
their knowledge will be shared and be contributed to the group abilities [13]? To the
best of our knowledge, most of the existing epistemic ATL-style logics do not assume
? This version corrected an error in its previous version published at AI’15. We specially thank
Prof.Wojtek Jamroga for pointing out the error.
ar
X
iv
:1
51
2.
01
91
5v
2 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 25
 N
ov
 20
16
that members of a coalition share knowledge unless the information is general knowl-
edge [7,24] or common knowledge [11] to a group or a system. However, most of the
time when a set of agents form a coalition, their cooperation is not merely limited to act-
ing together, but, more importantly, sharing their knowledge when acting. Safe opening
is an example.
This chapter aims to take the challenge of dealing with knowledge sharing among
coalitions. By a coalition we mean a set of agents that can not only act together to
achieve a goal, but also share their knowledge when acting. We say that a coalition
can ensure ϕ if the agents in the coalition distributedly know that they can enforce ϕ.
Based on this idea, we provide a new semantics for the coalition operator in ATL with
imperfect information. It turns out that this semantics is sufficient to preserve desirable
properties of coalition ability [12,22]. More importantly, we investigate how knowl-
edge sharing within a group of agents contributes to its coalitional ability through the
interplay of distributed knowledge and coalition ability. Our contribution is twofold:
firstly, this work can be seen as an attempt towards the difficulty: which kind of group
knowledge is required for a group to achieve some goal in the context of imperfect
information; secondly, these results show that the fixed-point characterizations of coali-
tion operators which normally fail in the context of imperfect information [3,4] can be
partially recovered by the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a motivating
example for our new semantics. Section 3 provides the new semantics and investigates
its properties. Section 4 explores the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators.
Section 5 discusses related work. Finally we conclude the paper with future work.
2 A Motivating Example
Let’s consider the following example which highlights our motivation to study coalition
abilities under the assumption of knowledge sharing within coalitions.
Example 1. Figure 1 depicts a variant of the shell game [7] with three players: the
shuffler s, the guessers g1 and g2. Initially the shuffler places a ball in one of the two
shells (the left (L) or the right (R)). The guesser g1 can observe which action the shuffler
does, while the other guesser g2 can’t. A guesser or a coalition of two wins if she picks
up the shell containing the ball. We assume that the guesser g1 takes no action (n) and
the guesser g2 chooses the shell (the left (l) or the right (r)).
Clearly, g1 knows the location of the ball but cannot choose. Instead g2 does not know
where the ball is, though he has right to choose the shell. It’s easy to see that neither
g1 nor g2 can win this game individually. But if g1 and g2 form a coalition, it should
follow that by sharing their knowledge they can cooperate to win. However, according
to the existing semantics for ATL with imperfect information including the latest one,
called truly perfect recall (also referred as no-forgetting semantics) [7], the coalition
of g1 and g2 does not have such ability to win since they claim that coalition abilities
require general knowledge or even common knowledge.
Moreover, these semantic variants fail to preserve the coalition monotonicity which
is a desirable property for coalition ability in coalitional logics [12,22], that is, if a coali-
tion can achieve some goal, then its superset can achieve this goal as well. For instance,
Fig. 1. the model M1 Fig. 2. the model M2
The tuple (α1, α2, α3) represents an action profile,.i.e, action α1 of player s, action α2 of player
g1, and action α3 of player g2. The dotted line represents g2’s indistinguishability relation:
reflexive loops are omitted. State q2 is labelled with the proposition win.
the model M2 in Figure 2 depicts a variant game of Example 1 by just switching the
available actions of two guessers. The guesser g1 chooses the shell and the guesser g2
takes no action. Then it’s clear that the guesser g1 can win no matter what the others do,
as he sees the location of the ball and can pick up the right shell. It should follow that as
a group, the guessers g1 and g2 can win this game. However, according to most existing
semantics, though the guesser g1 has the ability to win, this ability no longer holds once
he forms a coalition with guesser g2. These counterintuitive phenomena motivate our
new semantics for ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall.
3 The Framework
In this section, we provide a new semantics for ATL with imperfect information and
perfect recall based on the assumption of knowledge sharing in coalitions, and then
investigate logical properties of ATL under this semantics.
3.1 Syntax of ATL
Let Φ be a countable set of atomic propositions and N be a finite nonempty set of
agents. The language of ATL, denoted by L, is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ | 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ | 〈〈G〉〉ϕUϕ
where p ∈ Φ and ∅ 6= G ⊆ N .
A coalition operator 〈〈G〉〉ϕ intuitively expresses that the group G can cooperate to
ensure that ϕ. The temporal operator 2 means “from now on (always)” and other tem-
poral connectives in ATL are U (“until”) and© (“in the next state”). The dual operator
3 of2 (“either now or at some point in the future”) is defined as3ϕ =def >Uϕ. More-
over, the standard epistemic operators can be defined as follows: Kiϕ =def 〈〈i〉〉ϕUϕ
and DGϕ =def 〈〈G〉〉ϕUϕ. As we will show in the semantics, these abbreviations cap-
ture their standard intuitions, i.e., “Kiϕ” says the agent i knows ϕ, and DGϕ means it
is distributed knowledge among the group G that ϕ. The dual operators of K and D are
defined as follows: K̂iϕ =def ¬Ki¬ϕ, D̂Gϕ =def ¬DG¬ϕ.
3.2 Semantics of ATL
The semantics is built upon the imperfect information concurrent game structure (iCGS) [17,24].
Definition 1. An iCGS is a tuple M = (N,Φ,W,A, pi, d, δ, {Ri}i∈N ) where
– N = {1, 2, · · · , k} is a nonempty finite set of players;
– Φ is a set of atomic propositions;
– W is a nonempty finite set of states;
– pi : Φ 7→ ℘(W ) is a valuation function;
– A is a nonempty finite set of actions;
– d : N ×W 7→ ℘(A) is a mapping specifying nonempty sets of actions available to
agents at each state. We will write di(w) rather d(i, w). The set of joint actions at
w for N is denoted as D(w) = d1(w)× · · · × dk(w);
– δ : W × D(W ) 7→ W is the transition function from every pair (w ∈ W,α ∈
D(w)) to an outcome state δ(w,α) ∈W .
– Ri ⊆ W ×W is an equivalence relation for agent i indicating the states that are
indistinguishable from her viewpoint. For consistency, we assume that each agent
knows which actions are available for her, i.e., di(w) = di(w′) whenever wRiw′.
A path λ is an infinite sequence of states and actions w0
α1→ w1 α2→ w2 · · · , where
for each j ≥ 1, αj ∈ D(wj−1) and δ(wj−1, αj) = wj . Any finite segment wk αk+1→
wk+1
αk+2→ · · · αl→ wl of a path is called a history. The set of all histories for M is
denoted by H . We use λ[j] to denote the j-th state on path λ, λ[j, k] (0 ≤ j ≤ k) to
denote the segment of λ from the j-th state to the k-th state, and λ[j,∞] to denote the
subpath of λ starting from j. The length of history h, denoted by |h|, is defined as the
number of actions.
The following definition specifies what a player with perfect reasoning capabilities
can in principle know at a special stage of an imperfect information game.
Definition 2. Two histories h = w0
α1→ w1 α2→ · · · αm→ wm and h′ = w′0
α′1→ w′1
α′2→
· · · α
′
n→ w′n are equivalent for agent i ∈ N , denoted by h ≈i h′, iff
1. m = n,
2. wjRiw′j for any 0 ≤ j ≤ m, and
3. αk(i) = α′k(i) for any 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
where αk(i) is the i-th component of αk.
Intuitively, two histories are indistinguishable for an agent if (1) they have the same
length, (2) their corresponding states are indistinguishable for this agent, and (3) the
agent takes the same action at the each corresponding stage. Our notion of perfect recall
is more like GDL perfect recall [11,25] as well as perfect recall in extensive games [21]
by requiring that an agent remember the past states as well as her own actions. This
is stronger than the one in most epistemic ATL-style logics which often use the state-
based equivalence without taking the actions into consideration, that is, a (truly) perfect
recall agent just remembers the past states. Our version has the advantage to deal with
situations where different actions may have the same effects. For instance, consider two
histories q0
a→ q1 and q0 b→ q1 with a single agent. According to the state-based equiva-
lence, the agent cannot distinguish the two histories, but actually they are different from
her view since she takes different actions at state q03. Note that the perfect recall agent
does not observe or remember other agents’ actions.
In particular, we say two paths λ and λ′ are equivalent up to stage j ≥ 0 for agent
i ∈ N , denoted by λ ≈ji λ′, iff λ[0, j] ≈i λ′[0, j]. As mentioned before, we assume
that whenever a set of agents form a coalition to achieve their goals, the agents share
their own knowledge before acting. To make this idea precise, we extend the indis-
tinguishability relation ≈ji to groups as the intersection of all its members’ individual
equivalence relation, i.e.,≈jG=
⋂
i∈G ≈ji . Let≈jG (λ) denote the set of all paths that are
indistinguishable from λ up to stage j for coalition G, i.e., ≈jG (λ) = {λ′ | λ ≈jG λ′}.
A strategy is a plan telling one agent what to do at each stage of a given game. With
knowledge sharing among members of a coalition G ⊆ N , we say a strategy of agent
i ∈ G is uniform if the strategy specifies the same action for i at all histories which are
indistinguishable for G. Formally,
Definition 3. Given i ∈ G ⊆ N , a uniform perfect recall strategy for agent i w.r.t G is
a function fi : H → A such that for any history h, h′ ∈ H ,
1. fi(h) ∈ di(last(h)), and
2. if h ≈G h′, then fi(h) = fi(h′),
where last(h) denotes the last state of h.
Intuitively, a uniform perfect recall strategy for an agent in a group tells one of her legal
actions to take at each history and specifies the same action for indistinguishable histo-
ries of the group. In particular, the standard notion of uniform strategies with respect to
individual knowledge can be viewed as a special case. In the rest of paper, we simply
call a uniform perfect recall strategy a strategy.
A joint strategy for group ∅ 6= G ⊆ N , denoted by FG, is a vector of its members’
individual strategies, i.e., 〈fi〉i∈G. Function P(h, fi) returns the set of all paths that
can occur when agent i’s strategy fi executes after an initial history h. Formally, λ ∈
P(h, fi) iff λ[0, |h|] = h and for any j ≥ |h|, fi(λ[0, j]) = θi(λ, j) where θi(λ, j) is
the action of agent i taken at stage j on path λ. Obviously, the set of all paths complying
with joint strategy FG after h is defined as P(h, FG) =
⋂
i∈G P(h, fi). It should be
noted that if a group is characterized by full coordination both on the level of strategies
and knowledge, we may view the group as a single agent whose abilities and knowledge
are the sum of those of all the members [?].
We are now in the position to introduce the new semantics for ATL. Formulae are
interpreted over triples consisting of a model, a path and an index which indicates the
current stage on the path.
3 It is worth to mention that [23] proposed a way to embed actions to a state so that the state-
based equivalence can achieve the same meaning.
Definition 4. Let M be an iCGS. Given a path λ of M and a stage j ∈ N on λ, the
satisfiability of a formula ϕ wrt. M , λ and j, denoted by M,λ, j |= ϕ, is defined as
follows:
M,λ, j |= p iff p ∈ pi(λ[j])
M,λ, j |= ¬ϕ iff M,λ, j 6|= ϕ
M,λ, j |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M,λ, j |= ϕ1 and M,λ, j |= ϕ2
M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ iff ∃FG ∀λ′ ∈≈jG (λ) ∀λ′′ ∈ P(λ′[0, j], FG)
M,λ′′, j + 1 |= ϕ
M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ iff ∃FG ∀λ′ ∈≈jG (λ) ∀λ′′ ∈ P(λ′[0, j], FG)
∀k ≥ j M, λ′′, k |= ϕ
M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕ1Uϕ2 iff ∃FG ∀λ′ ∈≈jG (λ)∀λ′′ ∈ P(λ′[0, j], FG)
∃k ≥ j, M,λ′′, k |= ϕ2, and
∀j ≤ t < k, M,λ′′, t |= ϕ1
The interpretation for the coalition operator 〈〈G〉〉ϕ captures its precise meaning that
the coalition G by sharing knowledge can cooperate to enforce that ϕ. Alternatively,
the agents in G distributedly know that they can enforce that ϕ. A formula ϕ is valid in
an iCGS M , written as M |= ϕ, if M,λ, j |= ϕ for all paths λ ∈ M and every stage j
on λ. A formula ϕ is valid, denoted by |= ϕ, if it is valid in every iCGS M .
We first show that, as we claimed before, the abbreviations capture the intended
meanings of the epistemic operators.
Proposition 1. Given an iCGS M , a path λ of M and a stage j ∈ N on λ,
– M,λ, j |= Kiϕ iff for all λ′ ≈ji λ, M,λ′, j |= ϕ.
– M,λ, j |= DGϕ iff for all λ′ ∈≈jG (λ), M,λ′, j |= ϕ.
Proof. We just prove the first clause, and the second one is proved in a similar way.
It suffices to show that M,λ, j |= 〈〈i〉〉ϕUϕ iff for all λ′ ≈ji λ, M,λ′, j |= ϕ. The
direction from the right to the left is straightforward according to the truth condition
for U . We next show the other direction. Suppose M,λ, j |= 〈〈i〉〉ϕUϕ and for all
λ′ ≈ji λ, then there is fi such that for any λ′′ ∈ P(λ′[0, j], fi), M,λ′′, j |= ϕ. And
λ′[0, j] = λ′′[0, j], so M,λ′, j |= ϕ.
We demonstrate with the variant shell game that the new semantics justifies our
intuitions that the coalition of two guessers by sharing their knowledge can win the
game.
Example 1 (continued.) Consider the model M1 in Figure 1. It’s easy to check that at
the stage 1 on the left path λ1 := q0q1q2 · · · , neither guesser g1 nor guesser g2 has
the ability to win at the next stage, i.e., M1, λ1, 1 6|= 〈〈g1〉〉©win and M1, λ1, 1 6|=
〈〈g2〉〉©win. Instead when g1 and g2 form a coalition, after sharing knowledge, the
guesser g2 is able to distinguish the history q0q1 from the history q0q′1, then they can
cooperate to win, i.e., M1, λ1, 1 |= 〈〈{g1, g2}〉〉©win.
For the coalition monotonicity property, consider the model M2 in Figure 2. It’s
easy to check that at the stage 1 on the left path λ1 := q0q1q2 · · · , guesser g1 has the
ability to win at the next stage by choosing the left shell, i.e., M2, λ1, 1 |= 〈〈g1〉〉©
win. Moreover, when g1 and g2 form a coalition, then they can cooperate to win, i.e.,
M2, λ1, 1 |= 〈〈{g1, g2}〉〉©win.
It should be noted that the reason why alternative semantics [7,11,24] fail to keep
the coalition monotonicity property is that their interpretations of coalition operators
〈〈G〉〉ϕ are given with respect to either the union of each member’s equivalence rela-
tion or its transitive reflexive closure. This means that the coalition ability implicitly
requires general knowledge or common knowledge of the group, while neither of them
is coalitionally monotonic. Instead distributed knowledge is sufficient for coalition abil-
ity to preserve the coalition monotonicity property.
3.3 Properties of the New Semantics
We first show that the new semantics satisfied the desirable properties of coalition abil-
ity in traditional coalitional logics [12,22].
Proposition 2. For any G, G1, G2 ⊆ N and any ϕ,ψ ∈ L,
1. |= ¬ 〈〈G〉〉© ⊥
2. |= 〈〈G〉〉© >
3. |= 〈〈G〉〉©(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ
4. |= 〈〈G1〉〉©ϕ→ 〈〈G2〉〉©ϕ where G1 ⊆ G2
5. |= 〈〈G1〉〉©ϕ ∧ 〈〈G2〉〉©ψ → 〈〈G1 ∪G2〉〉©(ϕ ∧ ψ) where G1 ∩G2 = ∅
6. |= 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ→ ¬〈〈N\G〉〉©¬ϕ
Similarly for the 2 and U operators.
Clause 1 says that no coalition G can enforce the falsity while 2 states every coalition
G can enforce the truth. 3 and 4 specify the outcome-monotonicity and the coalition-
monotonicity, respectively. 5 is the superadditivity property specifying disjoint coali-
tions can combine their strategies to achieve more. 6 is called G-regularity specifying
that it is impossible for a coalition and its complementary set to enforce inconsistency.
The next proposition provides interesting validities about epistemic and coalitional
operators.
Proposition 3. For any G ⊆ N and any ϕ,ψ ∈ L,
1. |= 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ↔ 〈〈G〉〉©DGϕ
2. |= 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ↔ DG 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ
3. |= 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ↔ 〈〈G〉〉2DGϕ
4. |= 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ↔ DG 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ
5. |= 〈〈G〉〉DGϕUDGψ → 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ
6. |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ ↔ DG 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ
Proof. We only give proof for the first two clauses and the proof for 2, U is similar.
1. For every iCGS M , every path λ of M and every stage j ∈ N on λ, assume
M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ, then there is FG = 〈fi〉i∈G such that for all λ′ ∈≈jG (λ), for all
λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), M,λ′′, j + 1 |= ϕ. We next show that FG is the joint strategy
to verify 〈〈G〉〉©DGϕ. Suppose for a contradiction that there is λ1 ∈≈jG (λ), there
is λ2 ∈ P(FG, λ1[0, j]), there is λ3 ∈≈j+1G (λ2) such that M,λ3, j + 1 6|= ϕ. Then
λ3 ∈≈jG (λ) and θi(λ3, j) = θi(λ2, j) = fi(λ2[0, j]) for every i ∈ G, so there is
some λ∗ ∈ ⋃λ′∈≈jG(λ) P(FG, λ′[0, j]) such that λ∗[0, j + 1] = λ3[0, j + 1]. And by
assumption we have M,λ∗, j+1 |= ϕ. It follows that M,λ3, j+1 |= ϕ: contradiction.
Thus, M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉©DGϕ. The other direction is straightforward.
2. For every iCGS M , every path λ of M and every stage j ∈ N on λ, assume
M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ, then there is FG = 〈fi〉i∈G such that for all λ′ ∈≈jG (λ), for
all λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), M,λ′′, j + 1 |= ϕ. We next prove that for any λ∗ ∈≈jG (λ),
M,λ∗, j |= 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ. We consider the strategy FG and it is easy to check that for all
λ1 ∈≈jG (λ∗), for all λ2 ∈ P(FG, λ1[0, j]), M,λ2, j + 1 |= ϕ as ≈jG (λ∗) =≈jG (λ).
Thus, M,λ, j |= DG 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ. The other direction is straightforward.
Note that it is not generally the case that |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ → 〈〈G〉〉DGϕUDGψ.
Here is a counter-example. Consider the model M3 in Figure 3 with two agents 1 and
2 and states {q0, q1, q′1, q2, q′2}, where q1R1q′1, but not for 2, and all the other states
can be distinguished by both agents. There are two propositions p, q, and pi(p) =
{q1}, pi(q) = {q′1, q2}. The transitions are depicted in Figure 3. Consider the left path
λ1 := q0q1q2 · · · . It is easy to check that M3, λ1, 1 |= 〈〈1〉〉pUq, but M3, λ1, 1 6|=
〈〈1〉〉K1pUK1q.
Fig. 3. the counter-model M3 Fig. 4. the counter-model M4
It follows from Proposition 3 that the distributed knowledge operator and the coali-
tion operator are interchangeable w.r.t temporal operators© and 2.
Corollary 1. For any G ⊆ N and any ϕ ∈ L,
– |= 〈〈G〉〉©DGϕ↔ DG 〈〈G〉〉©ϕ
– |= 〈〈G〉〉2DGϕ↔ DG 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ
4 The Fixed-point Characterization
In this section, we will investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of
agents and its coalition ability in ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall. We
first show that, similar to [3,4], the standard fixed-point characterizations of coalition
operators for ATL [12] fail under our new semantics.
Proposition 4. For any G ⊆ N and any ϕ,ψ ∈ L,
– 6|= ϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉2ϕ→ 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ
– 6|= ϕ ∨ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉3ϕ→ 〈〈G〉〉3ϕ
– 6|= 〈〈G〉〉3ϕ→ ϕ ∨ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉3ϕ
– 6|= ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ)→ 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ
– 6|= 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ → ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ)
Here is a counter-example for the first one. Consider the model M4 in Figure 4 which
is obtained from M3 by just changing the valuations. There is one proposition p, and
pi(p) = {q1, q2, q′2}. Consider ϕ := p and the left path λ1 := q0q1q2 · · · . Then it is
easy to check that M4, λ1, 1 |= p and M4, λ1, 1 |= 〈〈1〉〉©〈〈1〉〉2p, but M4, λ1, 1 6|=
〈〈1〉〉2p. Thus, M4, λ1, 1 6|= p ∧ 〈〈1〉〉©〈〈1〉〉2p→ 〈〈1〉〉2p.
On the other hand, we have the following proposition showing that the converse
direction for 2 holds under the new semantics.
Proposition 5. For any G ⊆ N and any ϕ ∈ L, |= 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ→ ϕ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉2ϕ
Proof. For every iCGS M , every path λ of M and every stage j ∈ N on λ, assume
M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ, then there is FG = 〈fi〉i∈G such that for all λ′ ∈≈jG (λ), for all
λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), for all k ≥ j M, λ′′, k |= ϕ. In particular, λ ∈≈jG (λ), then for
all λ∗ ∈ P(FG, λ[0, j]), M,λ∗, j |= ϕ. And by λ[0, j] = λ∗[0, j], so M,λ, j |= ϕ.
We next prove that M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉2ϕ. It suffices to show that FG is
just the joint strategy for the both coalition operators. That is, for all λ1 ∈≈jG (λ), for
all λ2 ∈ P(FG, λ1[0, j]), for all λ3 ∈≈j+1G (λ2), for all λ4 ∈ P(FG, λ3[0, j + 1]),
we want to prove that for all r ≥ j + 1 M,λ4, r |= ϕ. As λ4 ∈ P(FG, λ3[0, j +
1]), then λ4[0, j + 1] = λ3[0, j + 1], then λ4 ∈≈j+1G (λ2), then λ4 ∈≈jG (λ2) and
λ4 ∈
⋃
λ1∈≈jG(λ) P(FG, λ1[0, j]). So by the assumption we have that M,λ4, t |= ϕ, so
M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉2ϕ.
Thus, M,λ, j |= ϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉2ϕ.
We now present the main result about the interactions of group knowledge and
coalition ability for ATL with imperfect information and perfect recall. Recall that K̂
and D̂ be the dual operators of K and D, respectively.
Theorem 1. For any G ⊆ N and for any ϕ,ψ ∈ L,
1. |= 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ↔ DGϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉2ϕ
2. |= 〈〈G〉〉3ϕ→ D̂Gϕ ∨ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉3ϕ
3. |= DGϕ ∨ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉3ϕ→ 〈〈G〉〉3ϕ
4. |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ → D̂Gψ ∨ (DGϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ)
5. |= DGψ ∨ (DGϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ)→ 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ
Proof. For every iCGS M , every path λ of M and every stage j ∈ N on λ,
1. assumeM,λ, j |= DGϕ∧〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉2ϕ, thenM,λ, j |= DGϕ andM,λ, j |=
〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉2ϕ. By the latter, we get that there is F 1G = 〈f1i 〉i∈G such that for all
λ1 ∈≈jG (λ), for all λ2 ∈ P(F 1G, λ1[0, j]), M,λ2, j + 1 |= 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ. It follows that
there is F 2·xG = 〈f2·xi 〉i∈G where x = λ2[0, j + 1] such that for all λ3 ∈≈j+1G (λ2), for
all λ4 ∈ P(F 2·xG , λ3[0, j + 1]), for all t ≥ j + 1, M,λ4, t |= ϕ. We next construct a
new joint strategy FG = 〈fi〉i∈G based on F 1G and F 2·xG . In order to define FG, we first
need the following notation. Let
X = {λ′[0, j] α→ w | λ′ ∈≈jG (λ),∀i ∈ G,α(i) = f1i (λ′[0, j]) and w = δ(λ′[j], α)}
Intuitively, X is the set of all possible outcomes generated by the agents in G taking
the next actions specified by F 1G from a history that is indistinguishable from history
λ[0, j]. We now define the strategy FG = 〈fi〉i∈G as follows: For all h ∈ H(M) and
for all i ∈ G,
fi(h) =
{
f2·li (h) if ∃l ∈ X such that l is a segment of h
f1i (h) otherwise
Note that this strategy is well defined, because if a history h has a segment in X , there
is only one such segment due to the fact that all histories in X has the same length
according to the definition for equivalence relation.
We next show that FG is just the joint strategy we need to verify 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ. That is,
for all λ′ ∈≈jG (λ), for all λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), we want to prove that for all s ≥ j,
M,λ′′, s |= ϕ. As for any l ∈ X , |l| > |λ′[0, j]|, then there is no l ∈ X such that l
is a segment of λ′[0, j], then by the definition of FG, FG(λ′[0, j]) = F 1G(λ
′[0, j]), so
λ′′[0, j + 1] ∈ X and M,λ′′, j + 1 |= 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ. From the later, we get that for all
λ• ∈≈j+1G (λ′′), for all λ∗ ∈ P(F 2·yG , λ•[0, j + 1]) where y = λ′′[0, j + 1], for all t ≥
j+1,M,λ∗, t |= ϕ. Since λ′′[0, j+1] ∈ X , then λ•[0, j+1] ∈ X . And by the definition
of FG and the assumption λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), we get λ′′ ∈ P(F 2·yG , λ•[0, j + 1]),
so for all s ≥ j + 1, M,λ′′, s |= ϕ. And by the assumption M,λ, j |= DGϕ, we get
M,λ′′, j |= ϕ. So for all s ≥ j, M,λ′′, s |= ϕ, so M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉2ϕ.
The other direction is proved by a similar method in Proposition 5.
2. assumeM,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉3ϕ, then there is FG = 〈fi〉i∈G such that for all λ′ ∈≈jG
(λ), for all λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), there is k ≥ j such that M,λ′′, k |= ϕ. Further
assume M,λ, j |= D¬ϕ, then for all λ∗ ∈≈jG (λ), M,λ∗, j |= ¬ϕ. Then for all
λ′ ∈≈jG (λ), for all λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), there is k > j such that M,λ′′, k |= ϕ. We
want prove that M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉3ϕ. It is not hard to show that FG is just the
joint strategy for the both coalition operators.
5. assume M,λ, j |= DGψ ∨ (DGϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉© 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ), want M,λ, j |=
〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ. We next prove this by two cases: either M,λ, j |= DGψ or M,λ, j |=
DGϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ.
If M,λ, j |= DGψ, then for all λ′ ∈≈jG (λ), M,λ′, j |= ψ, then we have that for
any FG, for all λ′ ∈≈jG (λ), for all λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), M,λ′′, j |= ψ by λ′′[0, j] =
λ′[0, j]. Thus, M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ.
If M,λ, j |= DGϕ ∧ 〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ, then M,λ, j |= DGϕ and M,λ, j |=
〈〈G〉〉©〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ. By the latter, we get that there is F 1G = 〈f1i 〉i∈G such that for all
λ1 ∈≈jG (λ), for all λ2 ∈ P(F 1G, λ1[0, j]), M,λ2, j + 1 |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ. It follows that
there is F 2·xG = 〈f2·xi 〉i∈G where x = λ2[0, j + 1] such that for all λ3 ∈≈j+1G (λ2), for
all λ4 ∈ P(F 2·xG , λ3[0, j + 1]), there is k ≥ j + 1 such that M,λ4, k |= ψ and for all
j + 1 ≤ t < k, M,λ4, t |= ϕ. We next construct a new joint strategy FG = 〈fi〉i∈G
based on F 1G and F
2·x
G . In order to define FG, we first need the following notation. Let
X = {λ′[0, j] α→ w | λ′ ∈≈jG (λ),∀i ∈ G,α(i) = f1i (λ′[0, j]) and w = δ(λ′[j], α)}
Intuitively, X is the set of all possible outcomes generated by the agents in G taking
the next actions specified by F 1G from a history that is indistinguishable from history
λ[0, j]. We can now define the strategy FG = 〈fi〉i∈G as follows: For all h ∈ H(M)
and for all i ∈ G,
fi(h) =
{
f2·li (h) if ∃l ∈ X such that l is a segment of h
f1i (h) otherwise
Note that this strategy is well defined, because if a history h has a segment in X , there
is only one such segment due to the fact that all histories in X has the same length
according to the definition for equivalence relation.
We next show that FG is just the joint strategy we need to verify 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ. That is,
for all λ′ ∈≈jG (λ), for all λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), we want to prove that there is r ≥ j,
M,λ′′, r |= ψ and for all j ≤ s < r, M,λ′′, s |= ϕ. As for any l ∈ X , |l| > |λ′[0, j]|,
then there is no l ∈ X such that l is a segment of λ′[0, j], then by the definition of FG,
FG(λ
′[0, j]) = F 1G(λ
′[0, j]), so λ′′[0, j+1] ∈ X andM,λ′′, j+1 |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ. From
the later, we get that for all λ• ∈≈j+1G (λ′′), for all λ∗ ∈ P(F 2·yG , λ•[0, j + 1]) where
y = λ′′[0, j + 1], there is k ≥ j + 1 such that M,λ∗, k |= ψ and for all j + 1 ≤ t < k,
M,λ∗, t |= ϕ. Since λ′′[0, j + 1] ∈ X , then λ•[0, j + 1] ∈ X . And by the definition
of FG and the assumption λ′′ ∈ P(FG, λ′[0, j]), we get λ′′ ∈ P(F 2·yG , λ•[0, j + 1]), so
there is r ≥ j + 1 such that M,λ′′, r |= ψ and for all j + 1 ≤ s < r, M,λ′′, s |= ϕ.
And by the assumption M,λ, j |= DGϕ, we get M,λ′′, j |= ϕ. So there is r ≥ j,
M,λ′′, r |= ψ and for all j ≤ s < r, M,λ′′, s |= ϕ, so M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ.
Thus, in both cases M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕUψ.
The clause 3 is proved by a similar method of clause 5, while the clause 4 is proved
by a similar method of clause 2.
The first statement says that a coalition by sharing their knowledge can cooperate to
maintain ϕ iff the coalition distributedly knows ϕ at the current stage and there is a joint
strategy for this coalition to possess this ability at the next stage. The second statement
states that a coalition by sharing their knowledge can eventually achieve ϕ only if either
the coalition considers it is possible that ϕ at the current stage or it has a joint strategy
to possess this ability at the next stage, while the third statement provides a sufficient
condition that a coalition by sharing their knowledge can eventually achieve ϕ if either
it is distributed knowledge among the coalition that ϕ or the coalition can cooperate to
achieve this ability at the next stage. The intuitions behind the last two statements are
similar to above two. In particular, we have the following result for a single agent.
Corollary 2. For any i ∈ N and any ϕ,ψ ∈ L,
1. |= 〈〈i〉〉2ϕ↔ Kiϕ ∧ 〈〈i〉〉©〈〈i〉〉2ϕ
2. |= 〈〈i〉〉3ϕ→ K̂iϕ ∨ 〈〈i〉〉©〈〈i〉〉3ϕ
3. |= Kiϕ ∨ 〈〈i〉〉©〈〈i〉〉3ϕ→ 〈〈i〉〉3ϕ
4. |= 〈〈i〉〉ϕUψ → K̂iψ ∨ (Kiϕ ∧ 〈〈i〉〉©〈〈i〉〉ϕUψ)
5. |= Kiψ ∨ (Kiϕ ∧ 〈〈i〉〉©〈〈i〉〉ϕUψ)→ 〈〈i〉〉ϕUψ
5 Related Work
In recent years, there are many logical formalisms for reasoning about coalition abilities
and strategic interactions in MAS. [10,13] provide a latest survey of this topic. In this
following, we will review several works which are most related to ATL with imperfect
information and perfect recall.
In the context of imperfect information, several semantic variants have been pro-
posed for ATL based on different interpretations of agents’ ability [1,19,24,17]. In par-
ticular, [6,18] provide formal comparisons of validity sets for semantic variants of ATL.
Similar to Bulling et al.’s no forgetting semantics [7], our semantics is also history-
based w.r.t a path and an index on the path, but there are fundamental differences. First
of all, we consider a finer notion of perfect recall by taking both past states and actions
into considerations to deal with situations where different actions may have the same ef-
fects. Secondly, our notion of group uniform strategies is defined in terms of distributed
knowledge instead of general knowledge as we assume that when a set of agents form
a coalition, they are able to share their knowledge before cooperating to ensure a goal.
Several epistemic-ATL style logics have been proposed to investigate the interaction
of group knowledge and coalition ability [6,11,24,?,?]. In particular, the most relevant
works are [11,?]. Specifically, [?] presents a variant of ATL with knowledge, perfect
recall and past. Different from our motivation, they use the distributed knowledge of
coalitions so as to have a decidable model-checking problem. [11] proposes three types
of coalition operators to specify different cases of how all agents in the coalition co-
operate to enforce a goal. Among them, the communication strategy operator 〈〈G〉〉c
captures the intuition behind our coalition operator. Specifically, we have the following
correspondence.
Proposition 6. Given an iCGS M , a path λ of M and a stage j ∈ N on λ, let ϕ be
any formula of the form©ψ, 2ψ or ψ1Uψ2, M,λ, j |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕ iff M,λ[0, j] |=euATL
〈〈G〉〉cϕ
However, their work is different from ours in the following aspects: firstly, they pro-
pose two epistemic versions of ATL, namely uATL and euATL, to address the issue of
uniformity of strategies in the combination of strategic and epistemic systems, while
we introduce a new semantics without adding new operators to the language to explore
the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators; secondly, their results mainly fo-
cus on the relations and logical properties of three coalition ability operators, while we
investigate fixed-pointed characterizations for the interplay of distributed knowledge
and coalition operators which is not involved in [11]; thirdly, their meaning of coalition
is more subtle than ours. Except the communication strategy operator, the comparison
with the other two strategy operators is less straightforward since they are based on as-
sumptions of coalitions without sharing knowledge. We hope to understand them better
in the future.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that [15] adopts a similar meaning of coalition
so as to capture the notion of “knowing how to play”. Besides the different motivations,
that work is based on STIT framework and just considers one-step uniform strategies
without investigating the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed new semantics for ATL with imperfect information and
perfect recall to explore the interplay of the knowledge shared by a group of agents
and its coalition abilities. Compared to existing alternative semantics, we have showed
that our semantics can not only preserve the desirable properties of coalition ability in
traditional coalitional logics, but also provide a finer notion of perfect recall requiring
an agent remembers the past states as well as the past actions. More importantly, we
have investigated the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators.
In the future we intend to study the computational complexity of ATL with this new
semantics, such as the model-checking problem. In this paper, we have investigated how
knowledge sharing within a group of agents contributes to its coalitional ability. This
work can be seen as an attempt towards the question: which kind of group knowledge is
required for a group to achieve some goal in the context of imperfect information. We
believe that it is an interesting question for further investigation by considering other
cases such as group without knowledge sharing or with partial knowledge sharing [?].
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